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	<title>Comments on: NASA Culture (2 of 2)</title>
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	<link>http://www.opennasa.com/2009/02/01/nasa-culture-2-of-2/</link>
	<description>Your NASA, My NASA, OUR NASA</description>
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		<title>By: kwilmoth</title>
		<link>http://www.opennasa.com/2009/02/01/nasa-culture-2-of-2/comment-page-1/#comment-10910</link>
		<dc:creator>kwilmoth</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2009 20:35:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>One of the unfortunate results of the modern age, where we are making improvements in the arena of tenths of percents as opposed to tens, is that our culture has become so risk averse that we are almost crippling any ability to explore. It&#039;s hard to say that we shouldn&#039;t take safety seriously, but exploration is inherently risky.  NASA&#039;s current approach to study the possibilities from every possible direction are impeding our steps outward.  

If NASA has a cultural problem, it&#039;s that we exist in a risk averse world where many people embrace bureaucracy because it&#039;s safer.  If we had a country that would support taking more risks in order to do more exploration, I think NASA&#039;s culture would change dramatically.  But who wants to be the one pointed to as the risk taker when some inevitable failure occurs? 

What would it take to get us there?  Would we support a president who endorsed that kind of vision? Is the country even behind us?  I think those questions linger in the minds of NASA employees and the uncertainty in the answers means no one is really willing to step up and say we need to take bigger risks.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the unfortunate results of the modern age, where we are making improvements in the arena of tenths of percents as opposed to tens, is that our culture has become so risk averse that we are almost crippling any ability to explore. It&#8217;s hard to say that we shouldn&#8217;t take safety seriously, but exploration is inherently risky.  NASA&#8217;s current approach to study the possibilities from every possible direction are impeding our steps outward.  </p>
<p>If NASA has a cultural problem, it&#8217;s that we exist in a risk averse world where many people embrace bureaucracy because it&#8217;s safer.  If we had a country that would support taking more risks in order to do more exploration, I think NASA&#8217;s culture would change dramatically.  But who wants to be the one pointed to as the risk taker when some inevitable failure occurs? </p>
<p>What would it take to get us there?  Would we support a president who endorsed that kind of vision? Is the country even behind us?  I think those questions linger in the minds of NASA employees and the uncertainty in the answers means no one is really willing to step up and say we need to take bigger risks.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter Robinson</title>
		<link>http://www.opennasa.com/2009/02/01/nasa-culture-2-of-2/comment-page-1/#comment-10898</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Robinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2009 15:09:14 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>As somebody who has been at NASA for 20 years I couldn&#039;t agree more with the post. On any given day I still feel the mix of starry-eyed wonder and also the ball and chain of bureaucracy. 

Bureaucracy, however, is a natural process of any organization as it matures. It is a lot easier to add new layers of requirements than it is to remove them. 
In NASA&#039;s case - asynchronous events occurred which caused the organization to change and grow.

Sputnik - merging of NACA with space goals
Apollo 1 fire - creation of safety directorate independent from programs
STS Challenger - Use of quantitative risk assessment (PRA) versus qualitative risk assessment (FMEA/Hazard analysis)
STS Columbia - Another reevaluation of process risk process.

Each of these events brought more requirements with it that we have to this day. It was done with the best on intentions - to reduce risk. It has however also introduced an organization that is caught in process vs. vision.

What to do about it? Just tossing requirements for the sake that there are too many of them is not useful. One needs to extract the information model of the agency. Once the model can be seen and studied it will be easier to argue for effective change. 

A good place to start is the CoFR - Certification of Flight Readiness document chain. Truly understanding all the documents and requirements if takes to meet CoFR will illustrated much of the NASA information model.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As somebody who has been at NASA for 20 years I couldn&#8217;t agree more with the post. On any given day I still feel the mix of starry-eyed wonder and also the ball and chain of bureaucracy. </p>
<p>Bureaucracy, however, is a natural process of any organization as it matures. It is a lot easier to add new layers of requirements than it is to remove them.<br />
In NASA&#8217;s case &#8211; asynchronous events occurred which caused the organization to change and grow.</p>
<p>Sputnik &#8211; merging of NACA with space goals<br />
Apollo 1 fire &#8211; creation of safety directorate independent from programs<br />
STS Challenger &#8211; Use of quantitative risk assessment (PRA) versus qualitative risk assessment (FMEA/Hazard analysis)<br />
STS Columbia &#8211; Another reevaluation of process risk process.</p>
<p>Each of these events brought more requirements with it that we have to this day. It was done with the best on intentions &#8211; to reduce risk. It has however also introduced an organization that is caught in process vs. vision.</p>
<p>What to do about it? Just tossing requirements for the sake that there are too many of them is not useful. One needs to extract the information model of the agency. Once the model can be seen and studied it will be easier to argue for effective change. </p>
<p>A good place to start is the CoFR &#8211; Certification of Flight Readiness document chain. Truly understanding all the documents and requirements if takes to meet CoFR will illustrated much of the NASA information model.</p>
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		<title>By: Santiago</title>
		<link>http://www.opennasa.com/2009/02/01/nasa-culture-2-of-2/comment-page-1/#comment-10850</link>
		<dc:creator>Santiago</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2009 16:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Awesome post, Garret!
I agree with the cultures you mention-- the pinnacle of possibility with space exploration, vs. the cynicism of a government organization.  I also think of it in different terms, with people who are there because they love space and those who are there for a particular job-- though this is NOT an indicator of optimism of cynicism I must say!
My first round at NASA I worked mostly with people who fell into jobs here-- many thought it was cool to be at NASA, but they weren&#039;t &quot;space geeks&quot;.  Now I am interact on a more regular basis with people who are here because they love NASA and space exploration.  Very different cultures indeed, but I think both are important.  Having folks at NASA who are not space geeks at heart provides for 1) diversity of perspective and 2) excellence in different fields (outside of core space fields like aerospace engineering and planetary science) because people are there to pursue their craft (biology, ME, ecology), not a value.  Of course, I&#039;m all for working at NASA because you believe in the value of space exploration, but I think non-space-geek experts keep NASA relevant and excellent.
&quot;Culture&quot; can be like &quot;climate&quot;-- it describes an overall pattern over time, but a given cultural experience can be as unpredictable as weather.  May we all be agents of successful cultural change today!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Awesome post, Garret!<br />
I agree with the cultures you mention&#8211; the pinnacle of possibility with space exploration, vs. the cynicism of a government organization.  I also think of it in different terms, with people who are there because they love space and those who are there for a particular job&#8211; though this is NOT an indicator of optimism of cynicism I must say!<br />
My first round at NASA I worked mostly with people who fell into jobs here&#8211; many thought it was cool to be at NASA, but they weren&#8217;t &#8220;space geeks&#8221;.  Now I am interact on a more regular basis with people who are here because they love NASA and space exploration.  Very different cultures indeed, but I think both are important.  Having folks at NASA who are not space geeks at heart provides for 1) diversity of perspective and 2) excellence in different fields (outside of core space fields like aerospace engineering and planetary science) because people are there to pursue their craft (biology, ME, ecology), not a value.  Of course, I&#8217;m all for working at NASA because you believe in the value of space exploration, but I think non-space-geek experts keep NASA relevant and excellent.<br />
&#8220;Culture&#8221; can be like &#8220;climate&#8221;&#8211; it describes an overall pattern over time, but a given cultural experience can be as unpredictable as weather.  May we all be agents of successful cultural change today!</p>
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